The Dilemma

Definition:

"A form of argument involving an adversary in the choice of two (or, loosely, more) alternatives, either of which is (or appears) equally unfavourable to him. (The alternatives are commonly spoken of as the ‘horns’ of the dilemma.) Hence in Logic, a hypothetical syllogism having a conjunctive or ‘conditional’ major premiss and a disjunctive minor (or, one premiss conjunctive and the other disjunctive)" (OED).

As part of the system of Aristotelian logic, dilemmas are still within the old metaphysics of literacy. It is our task to substitute something for the dilemma. If Game Theory is our contrast, perhaps we should look at the way game theory uses dilemmas as a primary mode of engagement. Two assumptions come to mind immediately: 

--Dilemmas are usually conceived in binaries--either/or. Even in 'volunteers' dilemmas when there are more than one person the choices that people have still appear limited and finite.

--The choices in a dilemmas may only "appear" unfavorable--they may not in reality 'be' unfavorable.

Dilemmas in History

Poundstone's commentary on Game Theory proper suggests that one of the problems with game theory is that it doesn't take into account how humans actually behave. Part of the way game theory portions off human behavior is that it structures things in terms of dilemmas. Poundstone claims that throughout human history the prisoner's dilemma (and the dilemma in general) is a primary mode of philosophical and literary engagement. He mentions Kant, Hobbes, Poe, Puccini, and Jesus (123-125).

Though not always, the dilemma is frequently conceived in terms of moral situations/examples, as Poundstone does in the first few pages of his book. Game Theory, however, conceives of dilemmas in terms of utility/value/choice/preference. Can we conceive of dilemmas in terms of other situations? Or should we ignore the dilemma altogether?

Poundstone argues the best solution to prisoner's dilemma is to avoid prisoner's dilemmas: "This is what we've been trying to do all along with laws, ethics, and all the other cooperation-promoting social machinery" (278). Thus, we have to find a way to conceive of the situation in which it would not be a dilemma. To a certain extent, it is only by framing situations in terms of dilemmas that they come about. 

Contrast--Joke?

For our own project, the task I think is to find an electrate way to promote cooperation strategies. In a recent email, Ulmer suggested to me that we might substitute "Prisoner's jokes" for a Prisoner's dilemma. How can we make a joke out of the "prisoner" situation described in Poundstone? Jokes maintain a sense of irony and distance, a sort of extra something--"wit" (Baudrillard will go into more detail about the importance of Wit) in the way Freud understood it. 

Can the joke/wit be applied to an accident?

Preliminary Thoughts on the Uses of "Strategy"

Communication and Opposition

Going back to Walton's example of the Dark Knight (I also immediately thought about this--thank you Utopia class), the dilemma really comes about by not knowing what the other person is going to do, but attempting to anticipate their actions. This situation means that the two (or three or four) people are completely isolated from one another and their interests are opposed. My first question is--how "isolated" are we in our fatal strategy? Do we need to anticipate an opposition? Must we act without the assumption of either a) iteration or b) communication? In one sense, we are isolated because our blogs will most likely circulate within our class and other people who will eventually interact with the CATTt and Heuretics. Furthermore, none of us are going to come up with a definite decision or plan of action and send it to the powers that be (that could change something) or find a way to change something materially on a mass scale. So, perhaps we need to "keep" the idea that we are prevented from communicating. But, I ask again, who is our 'opponent'? Do we have an opponent?

Volunteer's Dilemma

Part of the difficulty with understanding the contrast is going to be distinguishing between what Rebecca referred to as the "metaphysics" of game theory and the particular manifestation of Game Theory that Poundstone chooses to focus on: the prisoner's (and other) dilemmas. Is there one dilemma that will work better than the others as a model? Are these the essential situations of game theory? I believe Todd suggested either in blog post or an email that we can think about his e-waste problem as the "volunteer's dilemma". I'd like to second this emphasis because its our unawareness/ignorance/apathy of the world that I think we are trying to remedy--the attitude that "someone else will do it." This loss of affect (in all senses--not just 'emotional') is our postmodern condition (Jameson). Lynn Worsham in an essay on violence and composition argues that part of the task is to get students to feel like they have some sort of effect in the world--to get rid of the "someone else will do it" feeling. We have lost a sense of community and solidarity. When Ulmer came into one of my courses last year, he spoke of trying to develop a "sensus communis"--a term deriving from Kant who uses it to describe the aesthetic sense that presumably all humans have in common (Kant's claim is questionable, but I think the reference is appropriate). Anyway, this is all to say that I think the volunteer's dilemma is particularly interesting--but I could be wrong.

The necessity of Finitness in game theory

Ok, so that last paragraph was a bit of a deviation (but, to paraphrase Heidegger, to err is an essential part in the quest for truth). But I want to get back to the this instantaneous discussion. Poundstone defines strategy as "a complete description of how to play a game" --which he also moves on to say that this is usually not written down in the case of chess for instance (Poundstone 48). This is how one will find the "rational" ways of playing. This notion of strategy is tied up with the idea that (even a game like chess) is theoretically FINITE. Meaning, that in this sense, a game can be described as "a table of possible outcomes" (47). However, there are many different strategies that one can play; indeed the idea that game theory is outside of probabilility theory but still does not rely on chance is something we need to hang on to when we get to Baudrillard who will deny pure 'chance' exists if I remember correctly).

But lets dwell on this notion of "all" possible outcomes. I wrote in my notes, thinking Derridianly (yes, I just make an adverb out of Derrida's name) that this leaves no room for the (im)possible, which is the possible that is unexpected. Now, whether Derrida is relevant in this CATTt can be debated and I'd like to know now if I'm off track with this one. Still, game theories insistence of finiteness is a key part of its "metaphysics." Poundstone clearly points out that if bidding possiblities are indefinite there is NO WAY to work backwards in these games (270). The real world example is that there is no way to know hwo much a nation is willing to spend on defense (271).